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CORPORATE STATUTES-WHICH ONE APPLIES?
Mary Elizabeth Matthews*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a day of specialized corporate legislation, it may not be enough
for an attorney to master the general corporate statutes. To determine
the applicable statutory law, the Arkansas lawyer must also identify
the type of corporation under consideration-medical, dental, profes-
sional corporation, cooperative, nonprofit or profit, foreign or domestic,
insurance or banking corporation. Specialized statutes in Arkansas
have been tailored to meet the unique requirements of particular cate-
gories of corporations, which statutes may or may not be supplemented
by the general corporate law.
Furthermore, Arkansas has become a state which "grandfathers"
in new business legislation.' That is, recent statutes have been struc-
tured to apply automatically to business organizations formed after
their effective dates, but to permit entities already in existence to con-
tinue to operate under prior statutes. The Arkansas lawyer may there-
fore further need to know the date of incorporation of the relevant en-
tity to ascertain which corporate statute applies.
Finally, the lawyer must consider whether the applicable statute
has been amended. If so, the attorney must determine whether that
amendment is part of the body of law to which the relevant corporation
is subject.
In Arkansas, the specialized corporate statute may be structured
as an independent body of law, or may be supplemented by the general
corporate statutes. Since many of the specialized statutes incorporate
by reference the general corporate law, the general statutes will be con-
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. B.S., J.D., University
of Arkansas.
1. The most recent corporate code, the Arkansas Business Corporation Act of 1987, 1987
Ark. Acts 958 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-27-101 to -1706 (Supp. 1989)), applies only to
corporations either formed after December 31, 1987, or to those affirmatively opting for its cover-
age. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1701 (Supp. 1989) (transition provisions). The most recent
statute governing limited partnerships was similarly enacted in 1979. See Revised Limited Part-
nership Act, 1979 Ark. Acts 657, Art. 11, §§ 1101 - 1109 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-43-
1101 to -1109 (1987)), which provides that the Revised Limited Partnership Act applies only to
limited partnerships formed after July 1, 1979, or to those refiling under the new statute.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
sidered first.
II. GENERAL CORPORATE STATUTES
A. Classification by Date of Incorporation
General domestic corporations in Arkansas are governed by one of
two bodies of statutory law, depending upon their date of incorporation.
This bifurcation results from the method by which the Arkansas legis-
lature adopted the most recent general corporate statute. That statute,
embodied in the 1987 Arkansas Business Corporation Act (ABCA),2 is
mandatory only in regard to corporations formed after its effective
date.
The 1987 ABCA was derived from a model act proposed by the
American Bar Association.' As originally introduced in the Arkansas
legislature, the act applied both to existing corporations and to those
formed after its effective date." However, the original bill was modified
to permit pre-existing corporations to remain subject to prior law. The
final version of the statute, which became effective on midnight of De-
cember 31, 1987, permitted then existing corporations to be governed
by pre-existing law unless they elected to be governed by the new stat-
ute.5 Except as applicable to such nonelecting corporations, the prior
1965 statute and its amendments were specifically repealed.'
The 1987 ABCA contains several provisions attractive to corporate
boards (such as liberal limitation of director liability), 7 which have en-
2. The Arkansas Business Corporations Act of 1987, supra note 1.
3. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act (1984) was promulgated by the Committee
on Corporate Laws (Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law) of the American Bar
Association.
4. Proposed Arkansas Business Corporation Act, Draft of December 16, 1986, § 64-1701,
stated that: "This Act applies to all domestic corporations in existence on its effective date that
were incorporated under any general statute of this State providing for incorporation of corpora-
tions for profit if power to amend or repeal the statute under which the corporation was incorpo-
rated was reserved."
5. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1701 (Supp. 1989). Pre-existing corporations will continue to be
governed by the prior Arkansas Business Corporations Act adopted in 1965 and codified in AR-
KANSAS CODE ANNOTATED §§ 4-26-101 to -1204 (1987).
6. 1987 Ark. Acts 958, § 64-1705 provided that: "Except as applicable to those existing
domestic corporations not irrevocably electing to be governed by the provisions of this Act, as
permitted by Section 64-1701 hereof, this Act hereby repeals all laws or parts of laws contained in
the following Acts, as such Acts were originally adopted and thereafter amended: Act No. 576 of
1965, all sections .. "
7. The statute provides that the Articles of Incorporation may include "[a] provision elimi-
nating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director," within certain limits. ARK. CODE
(Vol. 13:69
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couraged pre-1987 corporations to elect its coverage. However, it is
troublesome that Arkansas domestic corporations are subject to varying
standards depending on their date of incorporation. Substantial differ-
ences exist between the two statutes, 8 and it is questionable whether a
potential shareholder will appreciate the significance of the date of
formation.
Structuring the 1987 corporate statute to apply only to future cor-
porations was a departure from the previous Arkansas approach, at
least in the corporate area. The prior corporation act, adopted in 1965,
applied to all corporations existing on its effective date, although
chartered under the corporate acts of 1869, 1927, or 1931.1 However,
Arkansas had enacted statutes on a similar basis in the limited partner-
ship area. Much like the new corporate statute, both the Limited Part-
nership Act, adopted in 1953, and the revised version, adopted in 1979,
provided that limited partnerships formed prior to the acts' effective
dates would continue to be governed by prior law unless complying
with filing procedures under the new acts."0
B. Amendments
Once the relevant statutory body is determined, the question be-
comes whether amendments to that statute affect corporations already
in existence. Although the case law in Arkansas indicates that current
ANN. § 4-27-202(B)(3) (Supp. 1989).
8. For example, the typical voting requirement for fundamental corporate changes under
the 1965 statutes is a two-thirds vote of those shares entitled to vote. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-
26-302(a)(4)(1987) (article amendments); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-1003(d)(1)(1987) (merger);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-1101(b)(1987) (dissolution). The typical voting requirement for such
changes under the 1987 ABCA is a majority of votes entitled to be cast. The section specifically
dealing with article amendments (ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1003(E) (Supp. 1989)) adopts the
general voting standard set out in ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-725 (Supp. 1989), which is more votes
cast for the proposal than against it. See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1103(E)(Supp. 1989)
(merger); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1402(E)(Supp. 1989) (dissolution).
For a discussion of other differences between the two corporation acts, see Arkansas Bar
Association, A Comparison of the New and Old Arkansas Business Corporations Acts (December
1987); Matthews, A Statutory Primer: The Arkansas Business Corporation Act of 1987, 1987
ARK. LAW NOTES 81; Brewer, An Overview of the 1987 Arkansas Business Corporation Act, 10
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 431 (1987-88).
9. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-103(c)(1987). Arkansas has had four general business corpo-
ration laws, enacted in 1869, 1927, 1931, and 1965. See Meek, Drafting of the Proposed Arkan-
sas Business Corporation Code, 17 ARK. L. REV. 347 (1964).
10. In regard to the 1979 Revised Limited Partnership Act, see supra, note 1. The Uniform
Limited Partnership Act adopted in 1953 was similarly adopted on a prospective basis. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-44-130 (1987).
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corporations are subject to legislative changes, a recent Arkansas At-
torney General opinion" concerning nonprofit corporations suggests
that only corporations created after an amendment are subject to its
provisions.
It has been clear since the United States Supreme Court decided
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward" in 1819 that the char-
ter granted to a corporation by a state constitutes a contract between
the corporation and its state of incorporation. The terms of the contract
include the charter itself, together with all implied terms garnered from
the state corporation statutes. Since the federal constitution prohibits
the state from impairing the obligations of contract, the agreement
cannot be unilaterally modified by the state.1 3 Therefore, a state cannot
enforce amendments to the corporate law against a corporation without
first obtaining its consent to such modification.
For that reason, the majority of states have reserved by constitu-
tion or by statute the right to modify the corporate law." The reserva-
tion of that power becomes part of the contract entered into when the
relevant charter is granted. The Arkansas provision, included in the
Constitution of 1874, states that "[clorporations may be formed under
general laws, which laws may, from time to time, be altered or re-
pealed.' 5 The 1987 ABCA also includes a specific statutory provision
reserving power to the legislature to amend or repeal the new
statutes.' 6
The Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized that corporations
have only those powers which their charters confer upon them, and that
the general laws under which a corporation is formed compose its char-
11. Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. No. 89-119 (July 7, 1989).
12. 18 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 629 (1819).
13. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1, states that: "No state shall...pass any. . .law impairing
the obligation of contracts ....
14. N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 22.07 (4th ed. 1985). The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that if the charter, the state constitution, or a state
statute reserves to the Legislature the power to alter, amend, or withdraw the charter, the subse-
quent exercise of the reserved power is not within the prohibition of the Federal Constitution as an
act impairing the obligation of a contract. See Ramapo Water Co. v. New York, 236 U.S. 579
(1915). This approach was suggested by a concurring opinion by Justice Story in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 18 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 629, 666 (1819) (Story, J., concurring).
15. ARK. CONST. art. XII, § 6.
16. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-102 (Supp. 1989) states: "The General Assembly has power to
amend or repeal all or part of this chapter at any time and all domestic and foreign corporations
subject to this chapter are governed by the amendment or repeal."
[Vol. 13:69
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ter.17 Since the Arkansas Constitution specifically provides that those
laws can be altered or repealed, the Arkansas Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that "the amendment or repeal of them operates as an
amendment or repeal of the charter."18 In effect, a corporation accepts
its charter powers subject to the reserved right of the state to alter or
revoke them.1 9 There need be no provision in the amendment for ac-
ceptance of the change or alteration in the charter by the corporation
or its stockholders, for an acceptance of the alteration is made by con-
tinuation in business after the change.2"
It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that substantive stat-
utory amendments are presumed to apply only prospectively.21 This
method affords notice to the public of the modification so that conduct
may be altered accordingly. Therefore, amendments to the corporate
law should apply only to actions or circumstances occurring after the
amendment. Prospective application does not mean, however, that
amendments should apply only to corporations formed after the effec-
tive date of the amendment.22
The latter position was taken by the Arkansas Attorney General in
a recent opinion regarding nonprofit corporations.23 The issue was
whether an amendment (which increased voting rights for members
17. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Biddie, 87 Ark. 587, 591, 113 S.W. 796, 798 (1908).
18. id.
19. Bank of Blytheville v. State, 148 Ark. 504, 509, 230 S.W. 550, 552 (1921).
20. Id. at 510, 230 S.W. at 552 (1921). The Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
The appellants assail the statute before us on the further ground that no provision is
contained in it for an acceptance of the change or alteration in the charter by the
corporation or its stockholders. This can make no difference, because, as said before, it
accepted its original charter on condition that the State reserved the power to revoke or
alter it, if the revocation or alteration did not have the effect of confiscating its prop-
erty. An acceptance of the altered charter was clearly made by continuation in business
after the change was made. Id.
21. SINGER, supra note 13, at § 22.36. See also Davis v. Moore, 130 Ark. 128, 138, 197
S.W. 295, 298 (1917).
22. In McKee v. American Trust Co., 166 Ark. 480, 266 S.W. 293 (1924), for example, an
existing corporation using the term "trust company" objected to a new statute prohibiting the
future use of that term in its corporate name. Among other defenses, the corporation argued that
to impose that law against an existing corporation constituted an ex post facto law. The Arkansas
Supreme Court rejected that argument, implicitly acknowledging that the issue is not whether
corporate existence began before or after the statute was enacted, but whether the conduct prohib-
ited took place before or after the statute was enacted. The court stated: "As to the contention
that Act 627 is void as an ex post facto law, it may be said that the Act is not subject to this
objection. It does not make any action taken before its passage unlawful." 166 Ark. at 489, 266
S.W. at 296.
23. Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. No. 89-119 (July 7, 1989).
UALR LAW JOURNAL
holding mulitiple memberships) applied to existing nonprofit corpora-
tions. The opinion first addressed the issue of retroactive versus pro-
spective application. Concluding that the amendment in question was
one of substance rather than procedure, the Attorney General correctly
determined that it was to be applied only prospectively.
However, the Attorney General interpreted "prospective applica-
tion" to mean that the amendment applied only to nonprofit corpora-
tions formed after the effective date of the amendment. Rather than
concluding that membership voting by nonprofit corporations (when-
ever formed) would be governed in the future by the amendment's new
voting standards, the Attorney General stated that the modification
"would in all likelihood be deemed by a court to apply only to nonprofit
corporations formed after the effective date of the amendment ... ."",
To illustrate the issue, consider the following example. Corpora-
tion A is formed on Day 1, when a particular statutory voting scheme
is in effect. On Day 2, the legislature modifies the voting scheme by
statutory amendment. On Day 3, Corporation B is formed. Finally, on
Day 4, both Corporation A and B undertake certain action requiring a
membership vote. The position indicated by the Attorney General is
that only Corporation B is subject to the statutory amendment. Rather
than applying the statutory amendment to membership votes held by
Corporation A or B after the amendment's effective date; the Attorney
General would apply it only to membership votes held by Corporation
B.
The opinion did not discuss the Attorney General's choice of the
date of incorporation, rather than the date of the relevant membership
vote, as determining whether the amendment applied to a particular
corporation. It appears that choice was suggested in the questions posed
to the Attorney General.25 However, the effect of the position taken by
the Attorney General must be considered. If the courts were to hold
that each substantive change in the corporate law applied only to cor-
porations thereafter formed, the body of law governing each corpora-
tion would be set on its date of incorporation. The problem would be
24. Id. at 1.
25. It appears that the line of demarcation was suggested in the phrasing of the initial
questions addressed to the Attorney General. Question one was posed as follows: "Do Sections 4-
28-212(a) and (b) as amended by Act 672 of 1989 apply to non-profit corporations in existence
prior to the effective date of the Act? Or, is this a substantive change in the law that does not
apply to non-profit corporations existing prior to the Act as the Act did not specifically provide
that it would apply retroactively?" Id.
[Vol. 13:69
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further exacerbated by the fact that corporations generally have per-
petual existence. In order to modify the substantive law, the legislature
would be required to await the incorporation of a new generation of
corporations against which to assert its legislative power.
The Arkansas case law does not reflect such an approach. The Ar-
kansas courts have repeatedly applied legislative amendments of the
corporate law to existing corporations. For example, in Leep v. Railway
Co. 6 a legislative amendment making employers liable for the immedi-
ate payment of wages at the discharge of an employee was imposed
against an existing corporation. In Ozan Lumber Co. v. Biddie27 an
amendment imposing liability on a corporate employer for acts of its
agent was applied to a previously formed corporation. Similarly, the
Arkansas Supreme Court applied subsequent legislative provisions to
existing corporations which placed double liability on stockholders for
debts of a banking corporation,28 imposed liability on bank stockholders
for public funds deposited in the bank29 and prohibited certain corpora-
tions from doing business under the name "trust company."30
Favorable, as well as detrimental, amendments are applied to ex-
isting corporations. For example, in Wasson v. Planters' Bank & Trust
Co.31 the Arkansas Supreme Court allowed an existing corporation to
take advantage of an amendment permitting banking corporations to
issue a new type of stock.
In each of the cited cases, the power of the legislature to amend
the corporate law applicable to the relevant corporation was placed in
issue. The response of the Arkansas Supreme Court is typified by Bank
of Blytheville v. State32 in which liability was imposed upon bank
stockholders for public funds. The court specifically recognized that the
amendment altered the corporate law, acknowledging that "prior to the
amendatory act of March 17, 1903, stockholders of a bank were not
liable for public funds, and that the amendatory act made them liable
for all public funds deposited therein. . . . ,,3 However, the court con-
cluded that such result was. sanctioned by Article 12, Section 6 of the
Arkansas Constitution, stating that:
26. 58 Ark. 407, 25 S.W. 75 (1894).
27. 87 Ark. 587, 113 S.W. 796 (1908).
28. Davis v. Moore, 130 Ark. 128, 197 S.W. 295 (1917).
29. Bank of Blytheville v. State, 148 Ark. 504, 230 S.W. 550 (1921).
30. M cKee v. American Trust Co., 166 Ark. 480, 266 S.W. 293 (1924).
31. 188 Ark. 343, 65 S.W.2d 528 (1933).
32. Bank of Blytheville, 148 Ark. 504, 230 SW. 550 (1921).
33. Id. at 508, 230 S.W. at 551-52.
1990]
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Every objection urged by appellants against the constitutionality of
the acts finds an answer in the fact that a corporation accepts its
charter powers subject to the reserved right in the State to alter or
revoke the charter whenever, in the opinion of the General Assembly,
such revocation or alteration is for the protection of the citizens of the
State, if done in such manner that no injustice may be done to the
corporators. 4
Therefore, despite the position taken by the Attorney General,
amendments to the 1987 ABCA, whenever adopted, should apply to all
corporations created after December 31, 1987, and to those corpora-
tions opting for its coverage. Prior corporations should be affected only
by amendments to the prior statute.3 5
III. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Unlike the provisions applicable to domestic corporations, those
sections of the 1987 ABCA applicable to foreign corporations were not
covered by a grandfather clause. The new statute stated that any for-
eign corporation authorized to transact business in Arkansas at mid-
night, December 31, 1987, was subject to the new statute,38 and the old
provisions were specifically repealed." Affected foreign corporations
were not required to obtain a new certificate of authority to transact
business.
The most significant change wrought by the new statute in regard
to foreign corporations was a reduction in the penalty for doing busi-
ness in Arkansas without authority. Foreign corporations are required
to file certain information with the Secretary of State in order to be
qualified to transact intrastate business in Arkansas.38 The sanction for
34. Id. at 509, 230 S.W. at 552.
35. The prior statute was specifically repealed by the 1987 ABCA, except as applicable to
corporations not electing to be governed by the new ABCA. See supra note 6. It therefore appears
unlikely that amendments to the 1965 provisions will be forthcoming.
36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1702 (Supp. 1989).
37. The previous statutes governing foreign corporations in Arkansas are set out at ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-27-101 to -109 (1987). The repealer section of the 1987 ABCA (1987 Ark. Acts
958, § 64-1705) specifically repeals the following acts in which those sections are found: 1907
Ark. Acts 313, § I (as amended by 1975 Ark. Acts 379, § 3); 1907 Ark. Acts 313, § 2 (as
amended by 1919 Ark. Acts 687, § 1, para. 1); 1911 Ark. Acts 87, § 3 (as amended by 1977 Ark.
Acts 475, § 1); 1911 Ark. Acts 87, § 14; 1947 Ark. Acts 131, §§ 1-5; 1939 Ark. Acts 187, § 1 (as
amended by 1947 Ark. Acts 214, § 2 and 1977 Ark. Acts 475, § 2); 1967 Ark. Acts 115, §§ 1-5;
1967 Ark. Acts 263, § 1; 1973 Ark. Acts 379, §§ 4-5.
38. Under the prior statute, a foreign corporation was required to file in the office of the
Secretary of State a copy of its articles or certificate of incorporation, a statement of assets and
(Vol. 13:69
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failure to file under the previous statute (known as the "Wingo Act")
was a harsh one. In addition to a potential minimum penalty of
$5000," 9 the foreign corporation was not permitted to enforce any con-
tract made in Arkansas in law or equity.'0 This was true even if the
foreign corporation subsequently complied with the statute.
The penalty under the 1987 ABCA is less severe. The foreign cor-
poration may not maintain a proceeding in Arkansas until it obtains a
certificate of authority, and may be liable for a civil penalty ranging
from $100 to $5000."' However, the statute expressly provides that the
failure to obtain a certificate of authority does not impair the validity
of the foreign entity's corporate acts or prevent it from defending any
proceeding in Arkansas."2 The commentary to the Revised Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act on which the section is based makes clear the
drafters intended a nonqualifying foreign corporation be able to enforce
a contract simply by qualifying.' 3
There may yet arise some interesting questions under the transi-
tion provisions. The 1987 ABCA clearly applies to foreign corporations
qualified to do business on the transition date, but its application is
somewhat more ambiguous as to nonqualifying corporations. The issue
is whether a nonqualifying foreign corporation which entered into a
contract prior to 1988 will be able to qualify and thereafter enforce the
contract.
The 1987 ABCA transition provisions suggest that the pre-1988
contract will be enforceable. The relevant section provides that "[i]f a
penalty or punishment imposed for violation of a statute repealed by
this chapter is reduced by this chapter, the penalty or punishment, if
liabilities and the amount of its capital employed in Arkansas, and its general place of business.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-104(a) (repealed 1987). Further, the foreign corporation was required to
file certain information regarding its capital stock, property, sales, and payroll. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 4-27-106(a) (repealed 1987). The 1987 ABCA requires the foreign corporation to complete an
application setting out the corporate name, date and place of incorporation, relevant addresses,
and certain information regarding shares owned by Arkansas residents. This is to be filed with the
Secretary of State along with a certificate of existence from the corporation's place of incorpora-
tion. ARK. CODE ANN. §4-27-1503 (Supp. 1989).
39. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-105(a)(1) (repealed 1987).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-104(2)(c) (repealed 1987).
41. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1502 (Supp. 1989).
42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1502(E)(Supp. 1989).
43. Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 15.02 comment (1984). The comment recog-
nizes that the sanction is not a punitive one, and that the failure of the corporation to qualify does
not affect the validity of corporate acts, including contracts. The comment goes on to state: "Thus,
a contract made by a nonqualified corporation may be enforced by the corporation simply by
obtaining a certificate." Id.
1990]
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not already imposed, shall be imposed in accordance with this chap-
ter.""" Arguably, the harsh penalty of voiding the contract is reduced
by the 1987 ABCA comply-and-enforce approach, and the penalty
should therefore be imposed according to the new statute.
It may take some time for the issue to arise. Since the lesser pen-
alty does not apply if the harsher penalty has already been imposed, it
appears too late for foreign corporations whose contracts have already
been held unenforceable at the trial court level to argue that the new
statute changes the result. The potential plaintiff who may benefit is a
nonqualifying foreign corporation with a pre-1988 contract upon which
no judgment has yet been entered.
Three Arkansas appellate cases have discussed Wingo Act de-
fenses since the effective date of the 1987 ABCA. Moore v. Luxor
(North America) Corp.,5 decided in January 1988, involved an effort
by a nonqualifying foreign corporation to enforce certain personal
guarantees made in 1985. In that case, the supreme court refused to
apply the Wingo Act to bar enforcement of the guarantees by the for-
eign corporation because the relevant contract was made out of state
and the Arkansas provision was therefore inapplicable.4 '
The second case, Midland Dev., Inc. v. Pine Truss, Inc.,7 decided
in May 1988, concerned a setoff claim by a nonqualifying foreign cor-
poration arising from a transaction in 1985. The Arkansas Court of
Appeals applied the Wingo Act to bar the nonqualifying foreign corpo-
ration's setoff claim because it was based upon the unenforceable
contract.'
The supreme court decided Germer v. Mo. Portland Cement Co."9
in February 1990. It involved an attempt by a noncomplying foreign
corporation to enforce a guarantee entered into in 1984. The court re-
fused to apply the Wingo Act to bar enforcement of the guarantee by
the foreign corporation because the relevant contract was interstate
rather than intrastate, and the Arkansas restriction was therefore
inapplicable.50
Although none of the opinions referred to the 1987 ABCA transi-
44. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1703(B) (Supp. 1989).
45. 294 Ark. 326, 742 S.W.2d 916 (1988).
46. Id.
47. 24 Ark. App. 132, 750 S.W.2d 62 (1988).
48. Id.




tion provisions, the 1990 decision cited the harsher penalty of the prior
statute and noted that it was the relevant law "[w]hen the obligations
in question here were incurred."51 Even had the courts specifically ad-
dressed the transition provisions, however, it does not appear any of the
three results would have changed. Only in the second case was the
Wingo Act applied, and the harsher penalty had been imposed by the
trial court before the effective date of the new corporations act. 2
Therefore, the statutory law applicable to foreign corporations doing
business in Arkansas should be the foreign corporation provisions of the
1987 ABCA. Any amendments to those provisions should also apply to
existing foreign corporations.
IV. MEDICAL AND DENTAL CORPORATIONS
Specialized statutes providing for the creation of medical and den-
tal corporations were adopted by the Arkansas Legislature in 1961."3
The statutes were brief, and were basically designed to preserve the
professional liability of the doctor or dentist, and to insure that only
professionals could function as officers, directors, or shareholders of
these specialized corporations. Both statutes stated that licensed per-
sons could associate to form a corporation "pursuant to the Business
Corporation Act (Arkansas Statutes 64-101 et seq.)." '54 Both statutes
further provided that "[t]he Business Corporation Act shall be applica-
ble to such corporations"5 5 but made clear that in the case of any con-
flict, the medical/dental subchapter would take precedence.56
The 1931 ABCA was the corporation code in effect when the spe-
cialized statutes were enacted.5 7 The issue is whether the medical and
dental corporate statutes continue to be supplemented by that repealed
statute, or whether they are supplemented by subsequent enactments.
51. Id. at 280, 783 S.W.2d at 360.
52. Summary judgment was entered by the Benton County Circuit Court on January 26,
1987.
53. Medical Corporation Act, 1961 Ark. Acts 179 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-
301 to -311 (1987)); Dental Corporation Act, 1961 Ark. Acts 471, (codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 4-29-401 to -411 (1987)).
54. 1961 Ark. Acts 179, § 2 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-301 to -311 (1987))
(medical); 1961 Ark. Acts 471, § 2 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-401 to -411 (1987))
(dental).
55. 1961 Ark. Acts 179, § 3 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-301 to -311 (1987)
(medical); 1961 Ark. Acts 471, § 3 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-29-401 (1987)) (dental).
56. 1961 Ark. Acts 179, § 3 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-29-302(b) (1987)) (medical);
1961 Ark. Acts 471, § 3 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-29-402(b)(1987)) (dental).
57. 1931 Ark. Acts 255.
1990]
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The legal commentary included in Sutherland on Statutory Con-
struction"8 discusses the effect of a specific reference in one statute to
the provisions of another. An express statutory reference results in the
adoption of the designated act as it existed at the time of the reference.
Such adoption does not include subsequent additions, modifications, or
repeals. Only a general reference in a statute to another body of law
encompasses that existing law, together with modifications occurring
thereafter.
This principle of construction has been recognized in Arkansas. In
Howard v. State5" the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged as
"well-recognized" the general rule that "when a statute adopts a part
or all of another statute by a specific and descriptive reference thereto,
such adoption takes the statute as it exists at that time, unaffected by
any subsequent modification of the statute adopted, unless a contrary
intention is clearly manifested."60 The supreme court cited with ap-
proval an annotation indicating that the operation of the adopting stat-
ute would not be affected by subsequent additions or even repeal of the
adopted statute, although a different legislative intent could be indi-
cated by the adopted statute or the circumstances surrounding its
enactment.6
Because the reference to the general corporation statute in the
medical and dental acts was an actual citation to a particular act, it
appears to be a specific reference. The question is whether the legisla-
ture indicated some contrary intent. When the legislature enacted a
new body of corporate law in 1965, the statutes specifically referred to
medical and dental corporations. The 1965 statutes stated that to the
extent that medical and dental corporations were subject to the prior
code, they would thereafter be likewise subject to the 1965 provisions.6 2
It seems clear, therefore, the legislature intended the reference incorpo-
rating the prior statute be superseded by the specific applicability lan-
58. IA N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 722-23 (4th ed. 1985).
59. 223 Ark. 634, 267 S.W.2d 763 (1954).
60. Id. at 636, 267 S.W.2d at 764. The court in that case did not apply the general rule
because it found that the reference in issue was general rather than specific. See also McLeod v.
Commercial Nat'l Bank, 206 Ark. 1086, 178 S.W.2d 496 (1944).
61. 223 Ark. at 637, 267 S.W.2d at 764.
62. 1965 Ark. Acts 576, § 3 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-103(d)(1987)). One of
the drafters of the 1965 corporate code has written that it was the intent of the drafting commit-
tee to subject medical and dental corporations to the provisions of the 1965 code to the same
extent that they had been subjected to the 1931 code. See Meek, Drafting of the Proposed Arkan-
sas Business Corporation Act, supra note 9, at 349.
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guage of the 1965 statutes.
However, the Arkansas Legislature in adopting the 1987 ABCA
did not specifically indicate that the new provisions applied to medical
and dental corporations. The 1987 ABCA merely contains a general
applicability section stating that "[t]his chapter applies to all domestic
corporations incorporated on or after its effective date."" s The statute
defines "corporation" or "domestic corporation" to mean "a corpora-
tion for profit, which is not a foreign corporation, incorporated under or
subject to the provisions of this chapter." ' Since medical and dental
corporations are arguably "incorporated under" the appropriate spe-
cialized statute "pursuant to" the 1965 corporate code, and are "sub-
ject to" the specialized statute except as supplemented by that 1965
corporation act, they do not appear to fall within the scope of the 1987
ABCA. The legislature could have indicated a contrary intent in adopt-
ing the 1987 ABCA, but the general applicability language is arguably
insufficient to do so.
The Arkansas Attorney General concluded that the 1965 corpora-
tions act continues to apply to medical and dental corporations."6 Ac-
knowledging the distinction between specific and general statutory ref-
erences, the Attorney General noted as "significant" the fact that the
relevant specialized statutes appear to refer specifically to the corpora-
tion statutes as contained in the 1965 Act. The Attorney General con-
cluded: "It is therefore my opinion that corporations formed pursuant
to these Acts are governed by Act 576 of 1965, the pre-existing Arkan-
sas Business Corporation Act, and not by the 1987 Act."6"
If the courts adopt this approach the applicable statutory law gov-
erning medical and dental corporations in Arkansas is the relevant spe-
cialized statute as supplemented by the 1965 ABCA. Such corporations
would not be affected by amendments to the 1987 ABCA, but only by
amendments to the prior statute.67
V. PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
The Arkansas Legislature adopted a statute permitting persons of-
fering professional services outside the medical field to form corpora-
63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1701 (Supp. 1989).
64. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-140(4) (Supp. 1989).
65. Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. No. 88-066 (June 17, 1988).
66. Id. at 4.
67. Such appear unlikely. Supra note 35.
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tions in 1963.68 The statute was similar to the medical and dental acts,
but included accountants, engineers, attorneys, architects, and other li-
censed persons in addition to providing an alternative for medical pro-
fessionals. Like the Medical and Dental Acts, the Professional Corpo-
rations Act stated that formation was "pursuant to" the Business
Corporation Act, and specifically cited the 1931 statute.69 It further
stated that "the Business Corporation Act" should apply to corpora-
tions formed under the specialized statute, unless conflicting with its
provisions.7"
Unlike medical and dental corporations, professional corporations
were not specifically mentioned in the applicability provision of the
1965 corporations act.71 However, the legislature made clear, in an
amendment to the professional corporation statute in 1970, that the
1965 statute was to apply to such professional corporations, 72 identify-
ing the 1965 general corporate statute specifically by act number.
Therefore, the issue as to professional corporations, just as in the
case of medical and dental corporations, is whether the specific applica-
tion of the 1965 Act was superseded by the general language contained
in the 1987 ABCA. Although the 1987 ABCA states that it applies to
"all domestic corporations,"73 such language may be held an insuffi-
cient indication of legislative intent to overcome the specific reference
by act number in the 1970 professional corporation amendment.
The aforementioned Attorney General opinion which determined
that medical and dental corporations remain subject to the 1965 Act
reached the same conclusion as to professional corporations.7 ' Noting
that all three statutes appear to refer specifically to the 1965 corpora-
tion code, the Attorney General concluded that corporations formed
pursuant to those statutes would be governed by the pre-existing gen-
eral corporations act rather than the 1987 ABCA.
Therefore, the statutory law governing professional corporations in
Arkansas should be the relevant specialized statute as supplemented by
the 1965 Arkansas business corporation statutes. Such corporations
would not be affected by amendments to the 1987 ABCA, but only by
68. 1963 Ark. Acts 155 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-201 to -213 (1987)).
69. 1963 Ark. Acts 155, § 2(a).
70. 1963 Ark. Acts 155, § 3 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-29-204 (1987)).
71. 1965 Ark. Acts 576, § 3 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-103 (1987)).
72. 1970 Ark. Acts 13, § 2.
73. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1701 (Supp. 1989).
74. Op. Ark. Att'y Gen., supra note 65 at 4.
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amendments to the prior statute.75
VI. COOPERATIVES
A cooperative is a unique form of corporation generally character-
ized by voting on the basis of membership rather than on the number
of shares held, and by participation in the returns of the enterprise on
the basis of business done with it.76 Cooperatives have often been char-
acterized as "nonprofit" because the income in a typical cooperative is
distributed to the members as part of the purchase price for the sale of
their products (usually agricultural) rather than as a return on invest-
ment.77 Such a characterization may even be imposed by statute.78
In Arkansas, a cooperative can be incorporated under a variety of
statutes. 79 The options include 1) a general cooperative statute;80 2) a
statute for marketing cooperatives;"' 3) a statute for agricultural co-
operatives;82 4) specialized statutes for rural electrification, 3 or tele-
communications cooperatives; 4 and 5) the general corporation statutes.
75. Such amendment appears unlikely. Supra note 35.
76. See generally, Farmer Coop. Service, USDA, Legal Phases of Farmer Cooperatives
(1976); Ark. Bar Ass'n, Agricultural Law System, Ch. 14 (Oct. 1988). A cooperative may be
structured as an unincorporated association, but cooperatives generally incorporate to attain the
same advantages available to other types of corporations.
77. See Legal Phases of Farmer Cooperatives, supra note 76 at 219-26.
78. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-2-101(b) (1987), which provides as to cooperatives
formed under the 1939 agricultural cooperative statute: "Associations organized under this sub-
chapter shall be deemed to be nonprofit, inasmuch as they are not organized for the purpose of
making profits for themselves or for their members, as proprietors, but only for their members, as
patrons and employees of the associations."
A compilation of cooperative statutes indicates that 28 of the 86 state cooperative statutes
include language deeming cooperatives to be nonprofit. See J. Baarda, Agricultural Coop. Serv.,
USDA, State Incorporation Statutes for Farmer Cooperatives 20 and Table 3.03 (1982).
Despite such statutory characterization, cooperative authorities continue to struggle with the
issue of whether cooperatives should be characterized as nonprofit. Cooperatives are generally
intended to generate a profit for their members, but differ from a typical corporation in that any
such profit is returned directly to the members rather than being realized by the cooperative entity
itself. See Legal Phases of Farmer Cooperatives, supra note 76.
79. See generally, Ark. Bar Ass'n, Agricultural Law System, supra note 76 at 14.5-14.
80. Cooperative Association Act, 1921 Ark. Acts 632 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-
30-101 to -117 (Supp. 1989)).
81. Cooperative Marketing Act, 1921 Ark. Acts 216 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 2-2-
401 to -429 (1987)).
82. Agricultural Cooperative Associations Act, 1939 Ark. Acts 153 (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 2-2-101 to -124 (1987)).
83. Electric Cooperative Corporation Act, 1937 Ark. Acts 342 (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-18-301 to -331 (1987)).
84. Rural Telecommunications Cooperative Act, 1951 Ark. Acts 51 (codified at ARK. CODE
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The specialized cooperative statutes may or may not be supple-
mented by the general corporation statutes. Courts have traditionally
applied general corporate law principles to cooperative issues, either di-
rectly or by analogy,8 5 and the majority of state cooperative statutes
adopt corporate law unless inconsistent with the cooperative statute.88
Two of the Arkansas cooperative statutes-the marketing cooperatives
statute and the agricultural cooperatives statute-specifically state that
"[t]he provisions of the general corporation laws of this state" apply
unless conflicting with express cooperative provisions.8 7
The Arkansas general cooperative statute was silent as to the ap-
plicability of corporate law until 1989, when the legislature adopted a
provision similar to that concerning marketing and agricultural co-
operatives.8 8 The provision was not enacted as an amendment to the
general cooperative statute, however, and has not been codified as part
of that statute. Rather, it has been noted by the Arkansas Code Revi-
sion Commission in the relevant annotations.8 9
In contrast to the foregoing cooperative provisions, the statute con-
cerning electric cooperatives specifically provides that it is complete in
itself, and the provisions of any other law of this state shall not apply."
The statute regarding telecommunications cooperatives is silent on the
issue, but includes many detailed provisions dealing with such matters
as consolidation, dissolution, and cooperative governance which indicate
that the legislature did not intend that it be supplemented by other
ANN. §§ 23-17-201 to -237 (Supp. 1989)). The term "telecommunications" was substituted for
the original term "telephone" by amendment in 1989. See 1989 Ark. Acts 438.
85. See A. Hoberg & D. Fee, Agricultural Coop. Serv., USDA, Director Liability in Agri-
cultural Cooperatives 1 (1984), which acknowledges that the similarities between cooperatives
and for-profit corporations "have resulted in the ready application by courts of corporate law
principles to cases involving cooperatives and cooperative directors" and that "in most respects
corporate law is fully applicable." See also J. Baarda, Corporate Rules Are Applied to a Cooper-
ative, Farmer Cooperatives (March 1990) (discussion of Atwood Grain & Supply Co. v.
Growmark, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ill. 1989)).
86. J. Baarda, supra note 78, at § 1.04 and Table 1.04.01.
87. ARK. CODE ANN § 2-2-428 (1987) (marketing cooperatives); ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-2-
119 (1987) (agricultural cooperatives).
88. 1989 Ark. Acts 493, § 5 states:
The provisions of the general corporation laws of this State, and all powers and rights
thereunder, shall apply to the cooperative corporations created under Subchapters I
and 2 of Chapter 30 of Title 4 of the Arkansas Code, except where such provisions are
in conflict with or inconsistent with the express provisions of Subchapters I and 2 of
Chapter 30 of Title 4 of the Arkansas Code.
89. See A.C.R.C. Notes to Subchapter 2, Chapter 30, Title 4, Arkansas Code Annotated
(Supp. 1989).
90. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-18-304 (1987).
[Vol. 13:69
CORPORATE STATUTES
law." The legislature in adopting recent amendments has acknow-
ledged that the 1987 ABCA does not apply to telecommunications
cooperatives.92
Because the references in the marketing, agricultural, and general
cooperative statutes are general rather than specific, the corporation
law as it currently exists should be the supplementary body of law. The
Arkansas Supreme Court in Howard v. State93 recognized as "well-
established" that:
[W]here the reference in an adopting statute is to the law generally
which governs the particular subject, and not to any specific statute or
part thereof, the reference in such case includes not only the law in
force at the date of the adopting act but also all subsequent amend-
ments or laws in force on the subject at the time it is invoked.94
Thus, cooperatives formed under those specialized statutes should be
governed by the relevant specialized statute as supplemented by the
1987 ABCA.
The Arkansas Attorney General, in a recent opinion, concluded
that the agricultural marketing cooperative statute is supplemented by
the 1987 ABCA.95 However, the Attorney General reached this conclu-
sion only as to cooperatives formed after the December 31, 1987 effec-
tive date of the 1987 ABCA. As for cooperatives formed prior to that
date, the opinion implies that despite the cooperative statute's general
reference, the 1987 Act does not supplement the specific statute.
Although the opinion appears to assume the law applicable to pre-
1987 cooperatives does not include the 1987 ABCA, the basis for such
a conclusion is not specifically addressed. The opinion only discusses
whether a pre-1987 cooperative could elect the coverage of the 1987
ABCA pursuant to the ABCA's own election provisions. Because the
election option in the 1987 ABCA was only granted to corporations for
profit,9 the Attorney General concludes that pre-1987 cooperatives
91. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-17-224 (1987) (consolidation); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-17-225
(1987) (dissolution); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-17-216 to -223 (1987) (governance).
92. The relevant statute was amended by 1989 Ark. Acts 438. The emergency clause to that
statute stated: "It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Arkansas
Business Corporation Act, enacted in 1987 establishes general standards for directors . ..and
that the Arkansas Business Corporation Act does not apply to a corporation organized for the
purpose of engaging in telephone service. .. ."
93. 223 Ark. 634, 267 S.W.2d 763 (1954).
94. 223 Ark. 636, 267 S.W.2d at 764.
95. Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. No. 88-066, supra note 65 at 2.
96. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1701 (Supp. 1989) provides: "A corporation incorporated prior
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could not opt for coverage.
Whether pre-1987 cooperatives could elect to be covered by the
1987 ABCA would be a moot issue if the statute applied automatically
by virtue of the cooperative statute's general reference. Therefore, the
Attorney General must have concluded the 1987 ABCA simply did not
apply to pre-1987 cooperatives. The implication is that such agricul-
tural cooperatives remain supplemented by the prior law, presumably
the 1965 general corporation statutes.
The problem with the approach taken by the Attorney General is
that it examines the general corporate statute to determine whether it
applies to an agricultural cooperative. Since by its terms the general
statute only applies to for-profit corporations, one is not surprised that
it does not provide agricultural cooperatives with a right to elect cover-
age under it.97
The better approach is to rely upon the specific agricultural co-
operative statute. The general reference in that statute to corporate law
appears to encompass any new legislation in the field, including the
1987 ABCA. It is arguable, however, that the same considerations
which persuaded the Arkansas Legislature to impose the 1987 ABCA
on a mandatory basis only upon post-1987 corporations justify a court
in imposing it only upon cooperatives thereafter formed. The rationale
underlying this approach is that although the cooperative statute nor-
mally adopts corporate legislation as it is enacted, the legislature suffi-
ciently indicated a contrary intent as to the 1987 ABCA.
A second problem with the Attorney General's approach is that
although the question was raised as to "cooperatives," only one of the
cooperative statutes-the act concerning agricultural coopera-
tives-was considered. Both that statute and the statute governing
marketing cooperatives contain general references to the corporate
law. 8 The 1989 provision applicable to the general cooperative statute
to such effective date under any general statute of this state providing for incorporation of corpo-
rations for profit may elect to be governed by the provisions of this chapter by amending its
articles of incorporation to provide that it shall be so governed." That section goes on to state:
"Domestic corporations existing prior to midnight, December 31, 1987, which do not elect to be
governed by its provisions shall continue to be governed by pre-existing law." However, as the
Attorney General acknowledges, "domestic corporation" is defined by the statute to mean only
corporations for profit. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-140(4) (Supp. 1989).
97. Despite the position of the Attorney General, a court may yet hold that a cooperative
has a right to elect the supplementary coverage of 1987 ABCA by characterizing the cooperative
as a profit corporation. See supra note 78.
98. A compilation of cooperative statutes indicates that 46 of the 86 cooperative statutes
include language making general corporation law applicable to cooperative associations. See J.
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is likewise a general reference. Presumably the Attorney General would
therefore adopt the same approach for all three statutes.
The statutory law applicable to cooperatives in Arkansas, there-
fore, appears much more uncertain than that applicable to foreign,
medical and dental, and professional corporations. For those coopera-
tives formed under cooperative statutes which contain a general refer-
ence to the corporate law, the statutory law applicable should be the
specific cooperative statute, supplemented by the 1987 ABCA as
amended from time to time. Despite the Attorney General's position,
such cooperatives should be subject to the 1987 ABCA regardless of
their date of incorporation.
The electric cooperative statute, which states that the provisions of
other law shall not apply, should not be supplemented by general cor-
porate provisions. The telecommunications cooperative statute is likely
to be similarly interpreted. Despite its silence on the issue, its complete
nature and recent legislative comments indicate that the legislature did
not intend that it be supplemented by the general corporate statutes.
VII. NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS
The specialized statute governing nonprofit corporations in Arkan-
sas is the Arkansas Nonprofit Corporation Act, adopted by the Arkan-
sas Legislature in 1963." 9 The Act applies to all not-for-profit domestic
corporations organized under its provisions, all not-for-profit corpora-
tions organized under any act repealed by it, and all foreign not-for-
profit corporations conducting affairs in this state.100 The new act spe-
cifically repealed the prior (1875) law for formation of nonprofit
corporations. 101
The statute states that it would "in no way affect" any pre-existing
nonprofit corporation whose primary purpose was for the education of
its members.10 2 The legislature made clear by a 1973 amendment to
the statute that the same policy applied to all pre-1963 nonprofits. The
1973 amendment states that the Nonprofit Corporation Act would "in
no way affect any nonprofit corporation chartered" under pre-1963 law,
and that such nonprofits could file a copy of the order whereby they
Baarda, State Incorporation Statutes for Farmer Cooperatives, supra note 78 at 14, and Table
1.04.01.
99. 1963 Ark. Acts 176 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-28-201 to -224 (Supp. 1989)).
100. 1963 Ark. Acts 176, § 3 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-203 (Supp. 1989)).
101. 1875 Ark. Acts 51 was specifically repealed by 1963 Ark. Acts 176, § 21.
102. 1963 Ark. Acts 176, § 22.
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were incorporated and be entitled to the recognition of their legal sta-
tus as if formed under the Nonprofit Corporation Act. 1 3 The amend-
ment further states that any pre-1963 nonprofit wishing to take advan-
tage of that provision should make the required filing within two
years."0 4
The issues in regard to this 1963 statute are: 1) whether it applies
to pre-1963 nonprofits; 2) whether amendments to the Act apply to
nonprofits already in existence; and 3) whether the nonprofit statute is
supplemented by general corporate law.
A. Application to Pre-1963 Nonprofits
The Arkansas Court of Appeals recently discussed the effect of the
1973 amendment to the Nonprofit Corporation Act in Wye Community
Club, Inc. v. Harmon.'°5 The parties in that case disagreed as to which
of two nonprofit corporations was the valid legal entity entitled to the
club's real property. The original nonprofit corporation was formed in
1944 and continued to function at the time of suit. However, that cor-
poration had failed to file its order with the Secretary of State as sug-
gested by the 1973 amendment to the Nonprofit Corporation Act.
When the problem was discovered, a group of its members arranged for
the incorporation of a new entity in 1986, with substantially different
bylaws. The 1986 entity then petitioned to quiet title to the club prop-
erty in itself, claiming that the failure of the 1944 corporation to file its
order of incorporation terminated its existence.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals held that the filing provision of
the 1973 amendment was permissive rather than mandatory. It inter-
preted the filing language to apply only to pre-1963 corporations wish-
ing to "take advantage of" the prima facie evidence of incorporation
provided by the 1963 Act. Pre-1963 corporations foregoing that advan-
tage were not required to file their orders of incorporation. Thus, the
court concluded that the 1944 nonprofit corporation remained in exis-
tence and was entitled to have the real property in issue quieted in its
name.
It appears settled that pre-1963 nonprofits continue in existence
whether or not they file under the 1963 Nonprofit Corporation Act. But
what statutory law governs them? The wording of the statute is some-
103. 1973 Ark. Acts 42, § 1 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-204 (1987)).
104. 1973 Ark. Acts 42, § 2 (not codified).
105. 26 Ark. App. 247, 764 S.W.2d 55 (1989).
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what ambiguous. Although the Nonprofit Act (as amended) states that
the provisions of the 1963 Act "shall in no way affect" nonprofits
chartered before 1963, the applicability section states that its provisions
shall apply to "not-for-profit corporations heretofore organized under
any act hereby repealed." The two sections can be interpreted consist-
ently if the former provision is interpreted to govern the entity's status
as a corporation, while the latter is interpreted to govern the law appli-
cable to that entity.
Thus, the statement that the Nonprofit Act shall not affect pre-
1963 nonprofits means that such nonprofits are validly formed as legal
entities whether or not their process of incorporation met the require-
ments of the 1963 statute, so long as it met the requirements of law at
the time of incorporation. This is true whether or not they file under
the 1963 Act, as held in Wye, and is consistent with the court of ap-
peals' approach to the section in that case as a provision dealing with
the status of the entity. The statement that the 1963 Act applies to
nonprofits formed under now-repealed statutes means that any non-
profit formed under the 1875 statute (specifically repealed) is now gov-
erned by the 1963 statute.
The Arkansas, Supreme Court in 1988 specifically recognized that
pre-1963 nonprofits were governed by the 1963 Nonprofit Corporation
Act. In Allen v. Malvern Country Club,106 stockholders of a nonprofit
corporation formed prior to 1963 brought suit to enforce certain stock-
holders' rights. The defendant Club answered that, although permitted
under the general corporation statute, nonprofit corporations had no
right to issue stock either under the prior nonprofit statute or under the
1963 Nonprofit Act. The Club therefore argued that the plaintiffs had
no enforceable rights. The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed, and af-
firmed dismissal of the suit.
The court unequivocally recognized that "[n]onprofit corporations
such as the Club are now governed by the 1963 Arkansas Nonprofit.
Corporation Act. .... ,,"07 Although the plaintiff shareholders in Allen
attempted to rely on the provision of the 1963 Act which states that it
would not "affect" pre-existing nonprofit corporations, the court indi-
cated that it would make no difference whether the 1963 Act or prior
law was applied, since there had never been any statutory authority for
the issuance of stock by a nonprofit corporation in Arkansas. Even had
106. 295 Ark. 65, 746 S.W.2d 546 (1988).
107. Id. at 68, 746 S W.2d at 548.
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such authority been found, however, the court's position that the prior
statutes had been "superseded 10 8 indicates that any conflicting provi-
sion of the 1963 statute would have prevailed.
The statutory law governing nonprofit corporations in Arkansas,
therefore, is the 1963 Nonprofit Corporation Act. As the supreme court
indicated in Wye, this should be the case whether the nonprofit corpo-
ration was created before or after 1963.109
B. Amendments
Since 1963 the Nonprofit Corporation Statute has been periodi-
cally amended, 10 and provisions relating to the merger and consolida-
tion of nonprofit corporations were added by separate statute in
1983."' The most recent amendment in 1989 provided for multiple vot-
ing by members holding more than one membership in a nonprofit cor-
poration. 2 The issue is whether such amendments apply only to non-
profit corporations created after the amendment, or also to nonprofits in
existence on the date of the amendment.
As discussed previously," 3 the Attorney General has recently indi-
cated that amendments to the nonprofit statutes apply only to nonprofit
corporations thereafter formed. This conclusion is questionable, and
will hopefully be rejected by the courts.
It is possible that the Attorney General intended the opinion to
govern only nonprofit corporations. That is, the argument may be made
that while amendments to the general corporate law apply to both ex-
isting and future corporations, amendments to the nonprofit statutes
apply only to future nonprofits. Although nonprofit corporations are
significantly different from for-profit corporations in purpose and struc-
ture, the distinctions are not such as should change the normal rules of
statutory construction. Even though nonprofit corporations are formed
108. Id.
109. 26 Ark. App. at 254, 764 S.W.2d at 59.
110. In addition to the 1973 amendment discussed above, see supra note 103 and accompa-
nying text, the Act was amended to provide for the distribution of assets at dissolution by 1977
Ark. Acts 181, § I (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-207 (1987)); to increase filing fees by
1987 Ark. Acts 1068, § 4 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-223 (Supp. 1989)); and to modify
voting requirements by 1989 Ark. Acts 672, § 2 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-224 (Supp.
1989)).
111. 1983 Ark. Acts 614 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-28-301 to -309 (1987)).
112. 1989 Ark. Acts 672, § I (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-212 (Supp. 1989)).
113. See notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
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by court order for the public benefit,' 1 4 they are still bound by legisla-
tive will.
If the legislature has made a policy choice that the law governing
nonprofit corporations should be changed, it should have the same
power to enforce that decision against existing nonprofit corporations as
it does against existing for-profit corporations. The different nature of
the nonprofit corporation should have been considered by the legisla-
ture in adopting the amendment, and it remains free to provide that the
amendment applies only to future nonprofits.
The legislative power to govern nonprofit corporations is not di-
minished by the fact that they are created by court order. The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court in considering the powers of a nonprofit corporation
in Allen v. Malvern Country Club' 5 recently recognized that
"[c]orporations organized under the laws of this state are but creatures
of the legislature . . . and the legislative power to create corporations
cannot be delegated to the courts.""' As in the case of for-profit corpo-
rations, the court further acknowledged in Allen that "[the laws of a
particular state which grant or restrict the powers of a corporation be-
come part of the articles of incorporation or charter of that
corporation."1
7
Although the relevant Attorney General's opinion did not justify
his conclusion on the basis of some perceived distinction between profit
and nonprofit corporations, it would seem that such an attempt should
fail. Both types of corporations should be immediately subject to legis-
lative amendment of the statutes by which they are governed.
C. Supplementation by General Corporate Law
Nonprofit corporations are distinctively different from for-profit
corporations. As indicated above, a nonprofit corporation is formed by
court order rather than by simple filing," 8 and only upon a finding by a
circuit court that its formation is "in the best interests of the pub-
lic."" 9 It must be formed for some type of charitable, educational, cul-
tural, or similar purpose,' and no part of its income can inure to the
114. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-206(b) (1987).
115. 295 Ark. 65, 746 S.W.2d 546 (1988).
116. Id. at 70, 746 S.W.2d at 549.
117. Id. at 70, 746 S.W.2d at 550.
118. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-206(b) (1987).
119. Id.
120. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-205 (1987).
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benefit of its members, directors, or officers.121 It issues no shares and
pays no dividends. 22
Although the Nonprofit Corporation Act is silent as to supplemen-
tation by general corporate law, the unique nature of nonprofit corpora-
tions and the completeness of the nonprofit statute indicate that such
supplementation was not intended. The Act includes detailed provisions
concerning corporate governance, 12 3 restrictions on the issuance of
stock,124 and involuntary dissolution.12 5 Sections governing merger and
consolidation were added by separate statute in 1983.126
The Arkansas Supreme Court has indicated that the nonprofit
statutes are not supplemented by general corporate law. In 1988 the
court in Allen v. Malvern Country Club 27 cited with approval a 1937
opinion in which "this court emphasized that the statutes governing
business corporations do not cover corporations organized under the
sections governing benevolent associations (nonprofit corpora-
tions) .. ."Ias The court therefore indicated that even though the gen-
eral corporate law permitted the issuance of stock, it constituted no
authority for nonprofit corporations to do likewise.
In determining an issue in regard to nonprofit corporations, how-
ever, the Arkansas courts may turn to general corporate law for guid-
ance. For example, in determining the requisite vote necessary for a
nonprofit corporation to sell and exchange certain real property, the
Arkansas Supreme Court, in Giss v. Apple, 29 cited general corporate
authority for the proposition that a majority vote of the shareholders
would be required.' 30 Although recognizing that the authority it quoted
"has reference to business [c]orporations,"' 131 the court nevertheless ap-
plied the rule to the facts in issue. Even in Allen, which clearly recog-
nized that general corporate law did not directly apply, the Arkansas
Supreme Court relied upon general corporate case law and legal com-
121. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-202(3) (1987). However, reasonable compensation may be
paid to members, directors, or officers for services rendered. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-215 (1987).
122. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-219 (1987).
123. For provisions regarding members, the board of directors, voting, and officers, see ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-28-210 to -213 (1987).
124. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-219(a) (1987).
125. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-222 (1987).
126. 1983 Ark. Acts 614 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-28-301 to -309 (1987)).
127. 295 Ark. 65, 746 S.W.2d 546 (1988).
128. 295 Ark. at 69, 746 S.W.2d at 549.
129. 239 Ark. 1124, 396 S.W.2d 813 (1965).




mentary in concluding that court approval of the nonprofit corpora-
tion's charter could not authorize an act (issuance of stock) which ex-
ceeded the authority granted by statute.
1 32
The statutory conclusions in regard to nonprofit corporations in
Arkansas, therefore, are that: 1) all current nonprofit corporations are
governed by the 1963 Nonprofit Corporation Act; 2) all amendments to
that Act apply to nonprofits formed either before or after the effective
date of the amendment; and 3) the Nonprofit Corporation Act is not
supplemented by general corporate law, although such may be applied
by analogy.
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
Even more specific miscellaneous statutes may govern particular
types of corporations. The more specific the statute, the less likely that
the legislature intended supplementation by the general corporate law.
For example, the general insurance statutes specifically provide that
"[t]he statutes of this state relating to the powers and procedures of
corporations other than insurance corporations shall not apply to do-
mestic stock insurers and domestic mutual insurers, except as
stated .. .133 The provisions for the organization of financial institu-
tions state that as to trust companies organized after 1923, "[t]he pro-
visions of the laws governing manufacturing and other business corpo-
rations shall not apply to them."'' A 1985 act encouraging the
development of capital in Arkansas defines corporations to mean only
those capital development corporations organized under its
provisions. 3 5
IX. CONCLUSION
The statutory law applicable to corporations in Arkansas presents
a complex picture. Even the basic diagram for general domestic corpo-
rations is divided into corporations formed before December 31, 1987,
132. The court relied upon Arkansas Stave Co. v. State, 94 Ark. 27, 125 S.W. 1001 (1910),
and upon sections of W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Rev.
Perm. Ed. 1986) and AM. JUR. 2d Corporations (1985).
133. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-69-103 (1987).
134. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-102 (1987).
135. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-4-1002(3) (1987).
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and those formed thereafter or electing the coverage of the new ABCA.
The initial split can be depicted thus:
1965 ABCA 1987 ABCA
(Pre-1987 Domestic (Post-1987 + Electing
Corporations) Domestic Corporations)
Overlapping the basic coverage of domestic corporations are those
specialized statutes which are supplemented by the general corporate
statutes. In an overlapping orbit around the 1965 ABCA are the spe-
cialized statutes which have specific references to the prior 1965 stat-
ute: the medical, dental, and professional corporation statutes. In an
overlapping orbit around the 1987 ABCA are the specialized statutes
which have general references to the corporate law: the marketing, ag-
ricultural, and general cooperative statutes.
In independent orbits are those specialized statutes which are self-
contained. These statutes include those governing nonprofit corpora-
tions, electric cooperatives, and miscellaneous specialized corporations
such as certain insurance or financial corporations.
Finally, contained within the 1987 ABCA are those provisions
governing foreign corporations. Although structured as a separate
chapter, those provisions may be seen as a subcategory of the corpora-
tions within the scope of the 1987 ABCA.
In enacting these statutes in piecemeal fashion over a period of
time, it is unlikely that the legislature had an opportunity to adequately
consider the overall structure of corporate statutes. As reflected by the
issues raised in regard to the recent Attorney General opinions, more
extensive consideration and explanation of the applicability of newly
enacted corporate statutes would provide better guidance to the courts
and the practicing bar.
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